RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN*
(Department of Church History,
University of Copenhagen)
Principia and Prologue in Francesco d’Appignano’s Sentences Commentary: The Question “Quaeritur utrum ens simpliciter simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae”
Summary: Two prominent parts of Francesco d’Appignano’s Sentences commentary are the Principia and the Prologue. After describing the difference between these two medieval theological genres, I examine the relationship between Francesco’s Principium in I Sententiarum and Prologue to the Sentences. My comparison of the texts indicates that Francesco reworked the Principium in I into at least two redactions of the very first question of one of the two versions of his Prologue.
Riassunto: I Principia e il Prologo sono due parti centrali del commento di Francesco d’Appignano sulle Sententiae. Partendo di una descrizione di questi due generi diversi del commento teologico medievale, il presente lavoro investiga la relazione testuale fra il Principium in I Sententiarum e il Prologo delle Sententiae. La collazione dei testi indica che il Principium fu utilizzato da Francesco per almeno due redazioni della prima quaestio in una delle due versioni del Prologo.
In Paris in the years 1319-20, when Francesco d’Appignano read or “commented on” the theological textbook in the Middle Ages, the Sentences of Peter Lombard, he was participating in the last major requirement he needed to complete in order to receive his doctorate. During this year of lecturing on the Sentences, Francesco would have been only one of many “bachelors” who were likewise engaged in their final studies, preparing to become masters of theology. As part of their duties these bachelors of the Sentences, including Francesco, would have held ceremonious lectures called Principia; they would also have given lectures on a specific part of Peter Lombard’s Sentences called the Prologue (Prologus). As it happens, two prominent parts of Francesco’s surviving Sentences commentary are the Principia and the Prologue. In this paper I want to discuss the Principia and the Prologue in Francesco’s Sentences commentary, first explaining what they are and, especially, how they differ from each other, and then considering the relationship between these two parts of Francesco’s work, focusing on a recent difference of opinion on the nature of the Prologue to Francesco’s Sentences commentary.
Principia and Prologue in Sentences Lectures
The Principia were not directly connected to the text of Peter Lombard’s Sentences; rather at the University of Paris they were lectures mandated by the statutes of the university to take place in special academic sessions before the terms actually began and the bachelors of the Sentences commenced their regular lecturing on the Sentences. During these special sessions – which could last up to several weeks – each of the bachelors who were to read the Sentences during the following term delivered a lecture concerning the very same theological topic. The bachelors would lecture in a specific order, one after another, and only one each day, so that the other bachelors, as well as the rest of the theological faculty, could attend these extremely important events – all other teaching at the faculty of theology was suspended during these sessions. The question to be debated was chosen by the bachelors themselves, although they were constrained to discuss an issue having something to do with the book of the Sentences they would soon be lecturing on. The Principia were meant to be debates or discussions between the bachelors; as a result, we often find in Principial lectures (and this is certainly the case with Francesco) that they involve a great deal of criticism of other views and replies to criticisms offered by the other bachelors.
Thus, every theologian who read the Sentences at Paris in order to obtain the doctorate held Principial lectures, and some of these, like Francesco’s, survive. Father Nazareno Mariani in his 2002 article concerning Francesco’s Sentences commentary, “Certezze e ipotesi sul commento alle sentenze di Francesco della Marca”, mentions one other author as having Principia that survive: Peter of Candia (d. 1410), a Greek Franciscan who read the Sentences at Paris in 1378-79 and went on to become Pope Alexander V in 1409. This is absolutely true. But when he did this, Peter of Candia was by no means imitating Francesco – he may not even have known about Francesco’s Principia; rather Peter of Candia, like every bachelor of the Sentences at Paris, including Francesco, gave his Principial lectures as part of the requirements for obtaining his doctorate. And there are quite a few other instances of Principia that have survived from the Middle Ages. Some of these are like Francesco’s: an actual written version, perhaps reworked to some extent, of the lectures that he gave before the University community. Examples of this (besides Peter of Candia) are John of Ripa, a Franciscan theologian at Paris from around 1350, and Bonsemblans Badoer, an Augustinian Hermit at Paris in the years 1358-59. Some of the principia we know of, however, are not preserved as separate treatises but instead were partially incorporated by the author into other works. Thus, both the Franciscan Peter Auriol, at Paris in 1316-18, and the Augustinian Hermit Gregory of Rimini, at Paris in 1343-44, insert passages from their Principial lectures into their Sentences commentaries. The Principial lectures were, it seems, an important foundation on which authors based later work, and this, as we will see, was the case with Francesco.
In contrast to the Principia, the Prologue to the Sentences is a part of Peter Lombard’s Sentences itself. In Lombard’s work, the Prologue is a small text – around three pages – in which Lombard discusses what he will do in the work that follows, getting at the truth of the faith by collecting passages from the Bible and the Church Fathers on many different topics, so they can be more easily investigated. Peter Lombard’s Prologue to the Sentences was, therefore, commented on in the course of the bachelor’s ordinary Sentences lectures, and a commentary on the Prologue is often – as is the case with Francesco – an integral part of the surviving Sentences commentaries of the era. In fact, by the time that Francesco wrote, the Prologue to a Sentences commentary was often a major piece of work, sometimes comprising several hundred modern pages. Here the medieval theologian would deal with issues central to the entire theological enterprise, like the nature of theology and human ability to know God.
Thus, the Principia and the Prologue were two distinct theological genres, connected to the Sentences commentary in different ways: while the Prologue is an integral part of Lombard’s work, the Principia were not directly linked to the text of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, but were mandated lectures. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile dealing with these two distinct genres together, because they are at the center of a difference of interpretation concerning Francesco’s written works.
Two Conflicting Theories Concerning Francesco’s Principium in I and Prologue
The difference of interpretation is as follows: the title of Francesco’s Principium on the first book of the Sentences is: Quaeritur utrum ens simpliciter simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae – i.e.: “it is asked whether absolutely simple being [i.e. God] can be the object of some science”. This question title is found as the first of Francesco’s four Principia in manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca nacional 504. A question with precisely the same title, however, is found in at least eight other manuscripts, and, with one exception, in these manuscripts it is placed so that questions of the Prologue associated with one version of Francesco’s commentary on book I of the Sentences immediately follows it.
In an article from 2001 dealing with the nature of Francesco’s surviving Sentences commentaries, Chris Schabel and I claimed that this one title actually belonged to two distinct questions: the Principial lecture on the first book of the Sentences as well as the very first question of the Prologue to the Reportatio version of Francesco’s I Sentences (the other version, the Scriptum, does not contain this question). For Schabel and me, there are two questions with precisely the same title, the one a separate Principial lecture, the other an integral part of the Prologue to Francesco’s Sentences commentary.
In contrast to our position, Father Mariani in his article from 2002 “Certezze e ipotesi” (pp. 94-97) listed this as a separate question only, and not as a part of the Prologue at all. Thus, presumably on account of the fact that the question, no matter where it is found, has precisely the same title, Father Mariani has called it the quaestio praeambula to Francesco’s book I of the Sentences, although it should be noted that Father Mariani did claim that there are four different redactions or versions of this question – I will return to this.
Now, this difference of interpretation means that for Father Mariani the Prologue to the version of the Sentences to which this question is appended contains only 10 questions, whereas according to Schabel and me, it has 11 questions. The two lists of questions are as follows:
Prologus in libros Sententiarum Francisci d’Appignano (Reportatio version)
Friedman/Schabel, pp. 73-74
1)Circa prologum Sententiarum quaero primo utrum ens simpliciter simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae viatoris.
2)Utrum theologia quam habemus de Deo simpliciter simplici nobis hic in via revelata procedat ex principiis per se notis vel tantum creditis.
3)Tertio quaero utrum scientia practica dicatur practica ab operatione elicita vel imperata.
4)Quarto quaero utrum speculativa et practica distinguantur principaliter ex obiecto vel ex fine.
5)Utrum practicum et speculativum sint differentiae immediatae.
6)Utrum istae sint differentiae essentiales vel accidentales.
7)Octavo (!) quaero utrum theologia viae sit practica vel speculativa.
8)Nono (!) quaero utrum theologia sit de Deo ut de primo eius obiecto vel subiecto.
9)Decimo (!) quaero utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia sub ratione absoluta vel relativa.
10)Undecimo (!) quaero utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae sub ratione absoluta essentiali vel attributali.
11)Duodecimo (!) quaero utrum aliqua alia scientia a theologia sit de Deo ut de primo subiecto.
Mariani, p. 98
1)Utrum theologia quam habemus de Deo simpliciter simplici nobis hic in via revelata procedat ex principiis per se notis vel tantum creditis.
2)Utrum scientia practica dicatur practica ab operatione elicita vel imperata.
3)Utrum speculativa et practica differant principaliter ex obiecto vel ex fine.
4)Utrum practicum et speculativum sint differentiae immediatae.
5)Utrum istae differentiae sint essentiales vel accidentales.
6)Utrum theologia <viae> sit practica vel speculativa.
7)Utrum theologia sit de Deo ut de primo eius subiecto vel obiecto.
8)Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia sub ratione absoluta vel relativa.
9)Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae sub ratione absoluta essentiali vel attributali.
10)Utrum aliqua alia scientia a theologia sit de Deo ut de primo subiecto.
Father Mariani’s list of questions, in the right hand column, has one fewer question than does Friedman and Schabel’s list of questions to the left, and this is because Father Mariani does not include as part of the Prologue the question that has the same title as the Principium on the first book of the Sentences. According to Father Mariani, there is one quaestio praeambula to the first book of the Sentences, and this question exists in four redactions. Correspondingly, on Father Mariani’s view, there are only ten questions in the Prologue to the Reportatio version of the Sentences. Schabel and I, on the other hand, hold that two different questions have exactly the same title; one of these two questions is Francesco’s Principial lecture on the first book of the Sentences, the other is the very first question of the Prologue to one of the two versions of Francesco’s Sentences commentary, and there are 11 questions in this Prologue.
It should be noted that when Schabel and I formulated our interpretation, we were basing ourselves on evidence found in the medieval manuscripts of Francesco’s works. That a version of our question is the very first question of the Prologue to the Sentences is explicitly stated in one manuscript: Vatican, Ross. 525. Here the question reads in English translation: “Concerning the Prologue of the Sentences, I ask first whether absolutely simple being could be the object of some science in this life”. In addition, at least one other manuscript (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France 3071) mentions that this question is the “first” question, and then numbers the questions of the Prologue consecutively from this first question, as can be see in the Friedman/Schabel question list above (although an error occurred in the numbering given in the manuscript beginning with q. 7). Moreover, in four other manuscripts, this question has been included by the medieval scribe in the section of the manuscript in which the contemporary rubric Prologus is written as the running title in the top margin. In short, the medieval manuscripts themselves give overwhelming support for identifying this question as the first question of the Prologue.
In the remainder of this paper I will try to show that this question that is causing so much trouble exists in two distinct versions – the version of the Principium and the version of the Prologue – and that Francesco himself heavily reworked one of the versions into the other. Thus, I want to argue that Schabel and I are correct in this difference of interpretation. With that said, I would like to stress that final answers to the question of the relationship between Francesco’s Principia and his Prologue, and indeed the rest of his Sentences commentary, will only be obtained (if they ever are obtained) when all of the material is easily available for study in critical editions.
The Question Whether God Can Be the Object of Some Science
The question itself – whether absolutely simple being (i.e. God) can be the object of some science – concerns one of the most important subjects that a medieval theologian could deal with: the Trinity. Specifically, the entire question is about the relationship between logic and the Trinity. God, as every Catholic believes, is three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, really different from each other, but identical with the same divine essence. This belief creates a problem for logic. Let’s take the most common example of a syllogism, a formal argument, involving trinitarian theology, in which two true premisses lead to a false conclusion:
The divine essence is the Father
The Son is the divine essence
Therefore the Son is the Father
Both of the premisses – that is to say the two first propositions: ‘the divine essence is the Father’ and ‘the Son is the divine essence’ – are true: The Father is the essence, and the Son is the essence as well, since all three divine persons are identical with the essence. And yet, the conclusion of the syllogism – ‘therefore the Son is the Father’ – is false, because the Son is not the Father, the Son is a different person from the Father. In the fourteenth century, this issue became extremely important to theologians, who wondered how the problem arose. It was clear to these theologians that the problem did not lie in the doctrine of the Trinity, since we know about the Trinity on the basis of revelation. So, they sought an answer to their question elsewhere. Was there something wrong with the logic that they were using? Or was the subject matter of the Trinity simply not suitable for logic at all? Or was there some other explanation for the problem of logic and the Trinity? How could this clash between trinitarian doctrine and logic be explained?
This is what Francesco’s question is about: how we can hold both the validity of Aristotelian logic and the doctrine of the Trinity, while at the same time also explaining why the syllogism we saw above does not work. And the tool that Francesco settles on in his discussion is one that he inherited from the greatest Franciscan thinker of the age, the Scottish theologian John Duns Scotus (d. 1308). Scotus had suggested that the way to explain how the Trinity and Aristotelian logic are not incompatible was to posit between the divine essence, on the one hand, and the properties that make each of the persons distinct, on the other, a non-identity secundum quid, a non-identity “in a certain respect” – better known as a formal distinction. This non-identity is something in God, since property and essence are indeed not entirely the same; and yet the difference was less than a “real” difference, like the difference between two human beings or between two rocks. According to Scotus, then, the problem with the syllogism above is that it fails to take into account the secundum quid non-identity that obtains between property and essence. It is true that the divine essence is the Father essentially, but there is nevertheless a secundum quid non-identity between them – the Father is not purely or absolutely identical with the essence. The same is true of the Son: Son and essence are the same essentially, but there is a secundum quid non-identity between them. On account of this non-identity, the syllogism
The divine essence is the Father
The Son is the divine essence
Therefore the Son is the Father
does not conclude – a specific type of fallacy arises that blocks the syllogism (called the fallacy of accident). Hence, Scotus believed that this secundum quid non-identity safeguarded both the doctrine of the Trinity and Aristotelian syllogistic logic: there was a perfectly good reason that the syllogism did not result in a true conclusion.
I cannot go into any detail here about Francesco’s interesting and intricate discussion, but to sum up briefly: Francesco’s treatment relies heavily on Scotus. Thus, Francesco posits a secundum quid non-identity or secundum quid distinction between property and essence, a distinction that is actually in God but is less than a real distinction, and he uses this to show how the doctrine of the Trinity is compatible with Aristotelian syllogistic logic. I should add that, typically, Francesco does not seem to be content to merely repeat what Scotus and other advocates of the secundum quid non-identity had said before, but critically examines the theory and appears to add original elements to it.
The question itself is organized as follows. In a short first “article” – or part – of the question, Francesco discusses the nature of “ens simpliciter simplex”, i.e. absolutely simple being or God. In a second article, Francesco investigates whether this absolutely simple being is at all compatible with some type of non-identity. Francesco argues that God is compatible with a secundum quid non-identity – in fact he posits three different types of secundum quid non-identity, and explains how each one applies to God. In the third article of his discussion, Francesco argues at length that the divine essence is in fact distinct secundum quid from each of the divine properties. According to Francesco, it is this distinction secundum quid that guarantees that the three persons are all identical with the essence while distinct from each other; as he says: “and thus identity without qualification [between persons and essence] saves identity and simplicity, the distinction secundum quid saves the plurality of persons.” In this third article, Francesco says that it is probable (probabiliter) that “the distinction secundum quid between essence and relation presupposes the distinction secundum quid of the attributes” – this was Scotus’ position, and Francesco’s statement is interesting because in the later Scriptum version of his Sentences commentary Francesco rejects just this view on several occasions, so it would seem as if we have here evidence of development in his thought away from a Scotistic position. The very long fourth and final article of this question is dense and sophisticated Aristotelian logic, in which Francesco attempts to show how this distinction secundum quid explains that syllogistic logic is compatible with trinitarian theology. In doing this, Francesco believes he can show how to defend scientific knowledge as such, built up from axioms and syllogisms in the way that Aristotle envisaged. This discussion, then, involves some of the most fundamental issues that medieval scholastics dealt with, and it is a rich and totally unexplored source for determining medieval views on the relationship between logic and the Trinity.
Two Versions of the Question
This question also exists in several versions, and so now I will turn to that aspect. I will show, by comparisons of extensive parallel texts, that there are two main versions, the Principium version and the Prologue version. Further I will show that the Prologue version has at least two sub-versions. Finally, I will argue that the Principium version was heavily reworked into the Prologue version, that is to say that the Prologue version postdates the Principium version.
Father Mariani in his article from 2002 isolated four redactions or versions of this one question. The fullest and most developed redaction, according to Father Mariani, is that found in manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca nacional 504 (called manuscript M): this is labelled redaction A. Shorter is redaction B, found in four manuscripts, of which I have consulted Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France 3071 (called manuscript H). Redaction C is found in three manuscripts, of which I have consulted Vatican, Chigi. lat. B.VII.113 (called manuscript C), and is described by Father Mariani as “more brief and less developed” than redactions A or B and “a type of summary”. Father Mariani gives a fourth redaction, redaction D, found in manuscript Vat lat. 943 (called manuscript E), and which he describes as “also more abbreviated” than the other redactions.
Now, using Father Mariani’s labels for the various redactions, I want to examine four examples of texts taken from each of the four redactions, in order to see whether we can’t determine more specifically the relationship between these texts.
The first example is taken from the very beginning of the second article of the question. Remember that here Francesco sets out to show that a secundum quid non-identity is not incompatible with God’s simplicity – that is to say that it is possible that there is a secundum quid non-identity in God. When one looks at all four redactions from the beginning of this second article in parallel, what is remarkable is that Redaction A is organized in a strikingly different way than are Redactions B, C, and D, and further that Redactions B, C, and D share the same organizational principle. Thus, if we look at the text in Redaction A, we find that Francesco uses three main arguments to show that a secundum quid non-identity is compatible with God, and in the text I have labelled these three arguments 1, 2, and 3. Now, if we turn to the text found in redactions B and D (redaction C deviates slightly here), after discussing briefly three views on the subject of non-identity in God – a discussion not found in Redaction A – Francesco tells us that he will prove his view according to four ways (quadruplici via). The first of these ways offered in redactions B, D, and in C is absolutely the same as the third argument offered in Redaction A, although in redactions B, C, and D it is supported by several more independent arguments, and is hence rather more elaborate than in redaction A. In the example of text included at the end of this article, I have put in bold small capital letters the beginning of the argument in each of the four redactions in order to make clear both that the argument is the same in all four redactions, and that it is situated in a very different place in redaction A as opposed to in redactions B, C, and D. What we have here, clearly, is a heavy reorganization of material, and redactions B, C, and D follow one pattern in contrast to redaction A, which follows another pattern. This reorganization is so radical that we can firmly rule out that it stems from scribal intervention: Francesco himself made these changes. Furthermore, I would like to point out that redactions B and D are extremely close to one another, close enough that – allowing for copyist errors – they might in fact be the same redaction. Redaction C, on the other hand, is quite different from B and D, while still following the same organizational pattern as B and D.
Let’s look at the second example to see whether this confirms the results of the first. The short answer to this question is that it does. The second example deals with two corollaries that Francesco adds to his considerations about the nature of unity and non-unity. In the first of these corollaries, Francesco argues that unity is a more positive characteristic than is plurality, even though plurality is also a positive feature of reality. The second corollary is quite interesting, since here Francesco argues that individuals of the same species have some extra-mental unity – that is to say, he argues for a type of realist position on the issue of universals. For our purposes in assessing the redactions of this question, what is interesting about these two corollaries is that, although they are worded in basically the same way in all four redactions, nevertheless in Redaction A the two corollaries are found in article three of the question, while in redactions B, C, and D the two corollaries are found in article two of the question. Francesco has placed these two corollaries in very different contexts in the various versions of the question – article two versus article three – and just as was the case with the first example, here we see that redactions B, C, and D follow a very different organizational pattern in comparison to redaction A. Moreover, I can point to the fact that, as in the first example, redactions B and D are remarkably similar – so much so that they may well be the same redaction –, while redaction C is rather different from and is in fact somewhat more elaborate than the B and D redactions.
This same pattern – redactions B, C, and D vs. redaction A – can be seen once again in our third example. This is found in article 2 of the question in each of the redactions, and it is Francesco’s explanation of the three different kinds of secundum quid non-identity: quidditative, intensive, and extensive. Here again we can see a very different organization in redaction A versus redactions B, C, and D. Thus, in redaction A, after describing the three different kinds of secundum quid non-identity, Francesco answers one argument to the contrary and then ends article 2 and begins article 3: “Quantum ad tertium articulum principalem”. So, in redaction A Francesco goes directly from his description of the three types of secundum quid non-identities on to article three of the question with no intervening text at all. This is in contrast to the structure found in redactions B, C, and D of the text: here, after describing the three types of secundum quid non-identity, Francesco brings a considerable number of arguments against his position, and then he replies to these arguments. Only after having replied to criticism of his position – around a column of text in redactions B, C, and D – does Francesco begin article three of this question. Thus, in redaction A, Francesco presents the three types of secundum quid non-identity and then moves immediately on to the next article in the question; in redactions B, C, and D he expands his discussion considerably before turning to his next topic. So, once again redaction A has a remarkably different structure than redactions B, C, and D, and this is witness to a heavy reworking of the question on Francesco’s part. Interestingly, once again the B and D redactions are extremely close to each other, and could indeed be the same redaction; and once again, as was the case in our second example above, redaction C gives considerably more detail than do either B or D, and so it is by no means a mere summary of the text.
The fourth example is perhaps the most important of them all. This is because here there are many clear signs that Redaction A is an early version of this question, and that redactions B, C, and D represent later reworkings of the same material. The text here is taken from the very beginning of the third article of the question, where Francesco attempts to show that there is in fact – indeed there is necessarily – a distinction secundum quid in God. If we look at the text from Redaction A, what we find is a poorly organized and unclear text. Francesco starts out by saying that he will posit two conclusions. The first conclusion he proves using three arguments, which I label 1, 2, and 3 in the text presented at the end of this paper. After these three arguments, Francesco says “Quantum ergo ad tertium articulum et principalem …”, that is to say: “with regard to the third, principal article …”; so it appears that Francesco begins the third article all over again. In fact, this is where Francesco begins to deal with the second of the two conclusions he announced at the beginning of the article – he just doesn’t inform the reader of this fact. It is only in the course of dealing with this second conclusion that Francesco tells us what he means when he uses the term ‘distinction’, an extremely important piece of information inasmuch as this entire article deals with the nature of distinction, and one wonders why this definition is given so late in his discussion. Now, this second conclusion states that, in God, just as there are three different types of secundum quid non-identity, so there are three different types of secundum quid distinction: quidditative, intensive, and extensive. But as soon as Francesco makes this claim, he turns to proving three, as he calls them, “conclusions”, not informing the reader what relation these conclusions have to what came before. In fact, each of these three conclusions is Francesco’s attempt to show why we have to posit one of the three different types of secundum quid distinction, but this fact is left entirely unstated and remains unclear. In short, the beginning of article 3 in Redaction A is a real mess.
When we turn to the beginning of article 3 in the other redactions, i.e. in redactions B, C, and D, we can see that the text has been improved considerably. Redactions B, C, and D all begin with a short explanation of what Francesco means by the term ‘distinction’, which plays such an important role in this article. So, now this crucial definition is right where it ought to be: at the beginning of the article. Then, he says that he will posit two conclusions, but he labels the conclusions clearly, so the reader knows precisely what is being discussed. Thus, the first conclusion is labelled by Francesco “negative”, and he says that in this conclusion he will show that it cannot be the case that the divine essence and relation are distinct without qualification (simpliciter); the second conclusion is labelled “affirmative”, and here Francesco says he will show that essence and relation are in some way distinct. All of this – the definition of ‘distinction’ and his description of the two conclusions he will posit – is said by way of introduction to the remainder of the article, Francesco showing his reader precisely how he is going to proceed. Only after this very clear introduction does Francesco go on to discuss first his negative conclusion, and then his affirmative conclusion. When discussing the affirmative conclusion, Francesco first lists the three types of distinction secundum quid found in God, the quidditative, the intensive, and the extensive, and then he deals with them one after the other; moreover, he clearly tells the reader that this is what he is doing. In contrast to the A redaction and its “conclusions”, where the reader was left guessing as to their purpose and relation to the rest of the text, in this version the exposition is straightforward and clear.
In sum, in this fourth example, Redactions B, C, and D share a very orderly and easy-to-follow discussion of difficult material. It is far superior in organization and formulation to the text found in redaction A. Moreover, the superior organization that has been introduced into the text is typical of a later rewriting, coming from reflection on what the reader needs to know at just what point in the exposition and how best to guide the reader to a better understanding of the material. The argumentation does not differ significantly; it is more in how the arguments are presented. Given this, it seems an unavoidable conclusion that the poorly organized A redaction represents an early version of this text, while the other three redactions, with their superior organization and formulation, are later reworkings. It should be noted that, as with our other three examples, the texts found in redactions B, C, and D, while differing from each other, nevertheless share a common structure as opposed to the A version. Moreover – again as in our other three examples – redactions B and D are rather close to each other, indeed close enough to be the same redaction if we allow for scribal errors; C, on the other hand, differs considerably from B and D.
Conclusion
Now, to conclude this paper, I’d like briefly to summarize the results reached on the basis of this examination of the redactions of the question “Quaeritur utrum ens simpliciter simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae”. There are two major versions of this question: redaction A, on the one hand, and redaction B, C, D, on the other. We know this on the basis of the considerable rearrangement of material shared by redaction B, C, D when compared to redaction A. In all of the examples we’ve looked at, the rearrangement is so radical that we can say with confidence that it was Francesco himself who reworked the text and it is not the result of scribal errors or changes. Further, I submit that we can explain this divergence of redactions best by claiming, in accordance with the medieval manuscripts, that redaction A is Francesco’s Principiumin ISententiarum, and that redactions B, C, D are various versions of the first question of the Prologue of Francesco’s Sentences commentary. Given this, the list of eleven questions for the Prologue, found in the 2001 article by Friedman and Schabel and reproduced above, would appear to be correct. Furthermore, on the basis of the evidence presented here, we can claim with a high degree of certainty that the Principium version of this questions is an early version, the Prologue versions (that is to say, redactions B, C, and D) are later reworkings, and are in several places better organized and more clearly formulated.
I have summarized these findings in the chart below. From an original question – most likely composed for Francesco’s Principial lecture in the autumn of 1319 – the text of redaction A was developed. On the basis of redaction A, or perhaps directly from the original question itself, Francesco composed the later redactions B, C, and D. As noted in the chart, we are entitled to conclude that redaction B and D are closely related to each other, and may well be the same redaction, when we allow for scribal errors. But this will require further research. The C redaction is clearly a separate reworking, but in several spots, as we have seen, it provides greater detail than the BD redaction. Whether the C redaction is a more developed version of this question or whether it is an intermediate version between the early A redaction and the later BD redaction, will require further research. But, for that, more critical editions will be necessary.
Redactio A (M, 3rb-vb): art. 2
Quantum ad secundum articulum, utrum simpliciter simplex compatiatur secum aliqualem non-identitatem ex natura rei.
<1> Responsio: dico quod sic, quod probo tripliciter. Primo quia quaecumque sunt universaliter* eadem sunt convertibiliter eadem ut sic, quia non possunt aliqua magis esse* convertibiliter eadem quam [quod] sint universaliter eadem. Sed essentia divina et paternitas non sunt omnino convertibiliter \eadem/. Ergo etc …. /M 3va/ ….
<2> Item, secundo, non-idem idem est quod non ipsum, sicut idem non* est aliud quam ipsum, ita non-idem non est aliud quam non-ipsum, quia hoc est esse idem, scilicet esse* ipsum, et hoc est non esse idem, scilicet esse* non-ipsum. Ex hoc arguo ….
<3> Item, tertio, removens aliquem modum unitatis ponit aliquem modum non-unitatis; patet quia remotio negationis ponit affirmationem. Unitas autem et non-unitas se habent sicut affirmatio et negatio. Ergo removens aliquem modum unitatis ponit aliquem modum non-unitatis. Sed ponens* essentiam et relationem eadem non convertibiliter – quod quilibet catholicus habet ponere, quia aliter sequeretur quod cuicumque esset eadem essentia esset eadem relatio – removet ab eis aliquem modum unitatis. Ergo cogitur* ponere inter ipsa aliquem modum non-unitatis ex natura rei. Probatio minoris: aequalitas rei vel est unitas vel est modus unitatis, quia secundum Philosophum, V Metaphysicae, capitulo de ad aliquid, eadem sunt quorum subiecta est una, similia quorum* aequalitas est una, aequalia quorum quantitas una. Certum est autem quod identitas et similitudo vel sunt species unitatis vel sunt rationes seu modi rationum unitatis. Ergo similiter aequalitas vel est species unitatis vel est ratio seu modus unitatis. Sed con-/M 3vb/-vertibilitas est quaedam aequalitas. Ergo removens modum convertibilitatis removet modum aequalitatis, et ita removet ipsum modum unitatis. Ergo ponit contradictionem.
Redactio B (H, 1ra-b): art. 2
Quantum ad secundum principale – quibusdam negantibus omnem non-identitatem ex natura rei a proprietate et essentia; aliis concedentibus ipsam, sed negantibus omnem distinctionem; aliis concedentibus non solum distinctionem et non-identitatem sed etiam distinctionem simpliciter posse se compati cum simpliciter simplici – dico quasi modo* inter istos quod possibilis est, immo de facto est necessaria, in simpliciter simplici aliqua non-identitas secundum quid. Hanc /H 1rb/ conclusionem ostendo quadruplici via.
Primo sic: removens aliquem gradum vel modum unitatis ponit necessario in eis aliquem modum vel gradum non-unitatis, si realem, realem, si rationis, rationis. Hoc patet <quia> remotio affirmationis est positio negationis, et e converso positio negationis etc. Sed omnis Catholicus habet removere ab essentia et relatione aliquem gradum vel modum unitatis, puta modum unitatis convertibiliter*, sunt enim extra intellectum non convertibiliter eadem. Hoc autem, videlicet ‘convertibiliter’, dicit modum vel gradum unitatis. Ergo etc.
Sed respondetur quod unum convertibiliter non dicit modum vel gradum unitati proprium sed communem sibi vel pluralitati, et ideo non oportet, si inter aliqua est non-<unitas> [identitas H] convertibilis, quod aliqua sit non-identitas inter ipsa vel aliquis gradus non-identitatis.
Contra responsionem eadem via ut supra: “removens ab aliquibus aliquem gradum unitatis, ponit”, etc. Sed removens ab essentia et relatione esse idem convertibiliter, removet ab eis modum unitatis proprium <unitati et> non <communem> sibi et pluralitati. Ergo etc. Minor probatur – scilicet quod convertibilitas sit proprius modus unitatis et non communis – probatur quadrupliciter.
Primo sic …. Secundo sic ….
Tertio sic: Aristoteles, III et IV et V Metaphysicae, et in IV ponit duas coordinationes, videlicet unitatis et pluralitatis, et ponit idem, simile, et aequale ex parte unitatis, his autem opposita ex parte pluralitatis et multitudinis. Unde dicit <Aristoteles>, V Metaphysicae, quod illa sunt eadem quorum substantia est una, illa sunt similia quorum qualis est una, et aequalia quorum quantita[ti]s est una. Oppositum de oppositis. Tunc sic: sicut se habet identitas ad substantiam, ita aequalitas ad quantitatem. Sed identitas in substantia non est communis sibi et pluralitati[s], alias non magis poneretur in coordinatione unitatis quam pluralitatis. Ergo, etc. Sed convertibilitas est quaedam aequalitas. Ergo, etc.
Quarto sic …
Redactio D (E, 95va): art. 2
Quantum ad secundum principale – quibusdam dicentibus quod nullo modo concedenda est aliqua non-identitatis ex natura rei inter proprietatem et essentiam in divinis; quibusdam vero concedentibus eam, negantibus tamen omnem distinctionem; quibusdam vero tertio et non-identitatem et distinctionem, et non solum secundum quid sed simpliciter, posse stare cum simpliciter simplici – dico quasi mediando* quod in simpliciter simplici est non-identitas secundum quid. Et hanc conclusionem probo quadruplica via.
Primo sic: removens ab aliquibus aliquem modum vel gradum unitatis ponit necessario in eis aliquem modum non-unitatis, et si realem, realem, et si rationis, rationis, quia remotio affirmationis est positio negationis, et e converso. Sed omnis catholicus habet removere ab essentia et relatione aliquem modum vel gradum unitatis, puta modum unitatis convertibiliter, sunt enim extra intellectum non eadem convertibiliter. Unitas autem convertibilis dicit gradum unitatis. Quare etc.
Respondeo quod esse unum convertibiliter non dicit gradum vel modum proprium unitatis sed communem sibi et pluralitati, et ideo non oportet quod, si inter aliqua sit non-unitas convertibilis, quod propter hoc fit* aliqua non-identitas nec aliquis gradus non-identitatis inter ea.
Contra hoc arguo resumendo eandem maiorem sic: “removens”, etc. Sed removens ab essentia et relatione esse unum convertibiliter, removet ab eis modum proprium unitati et non communem sibi et pluralitati. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris – scilicet quod unitas convertibilitatis sit modus proprius unitati et non communis sibi et pluralitati – quadrupliciter.
Primo sic ….
Secundo sic, quia IV et V Metaphysicae, Philosophus ponens duas coordinationes, scilicet unitatis et pluralitatis /E 95vb/ ponit idem, aequale, et simile ex parte unitatis, et opposita his ex parte pluralitatis et multitudinis. Unde V Metaphysicae, dicit <Aristoteles> quod eadem sunt quorum substantia est una, et similia sunt quorum qualitas est una, et aequalia quorum quanitas est una. Et opposita dicit de oppositis. Tunc sicut se habet identitas ad substantiam, ita aequalitas ad quantitatem. Sed identitas in substantia non est communis unitati et pluralitati, aliter non magis poneretur* in ordine unitatis quam pluralitatis. Ergo, etc. Sed convertibilitas est quaedam aequalitas. Ergo etc. ….
Tertio sic …. Quarto sic ….
Redactio C (C, 3ra-b): art. 2
Quantum ad secundum articulum, dico quod tale simplex compatitur secum aliquam non-identitatem secundum quid, et hoc est ex natura rei.
Et hoc probo primo sic: removens aliquem modum unitatis vel identitatis ponit aliquem modum non-identitatis, quia removens affirmationem ponit negationem, cum sint contradictoria. Sed quilibet Catholicus habet removere necessario ab essentia et relatione aliquem modum unitatis. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quia unitas vel convertibilitas est quidam modus unitatis. Sed omnes habent removere modum unitatis convertibilis. Igitur omnes habent ponere modum non-unitatis convertibilis.
Sed ad hoc dicunt aliqui quod iste modus unitatis non est proprius modus unitatis, sed est communis unitati et distinctioni*, et per consequens ex non-convertibilitate non arguitur aliqua non-identitas. Hoc patet, quia homo et animal sunt idem et non convertuntur, et homo et risibile differunt essentialiter, et tamen convertuntur. Igitur ex convertibilitate non potest argui unitas, nec diversitas ex inconvertibilitate.
Contra probo quadrupliciter quod iste modus non est communis unitati et distinctioni, sed est proprius unitate.
Primo sic ….Secundo sic …. /C 3rb/ ....
Tertio sic: IV et V et X* Metaphysicae ponuntur duae coordinationes – in una ponitur unum, simile, et aequale, in alia diversum, dissimile, et inaequale. Tunc sic: sicut se habet identitas in substantia ad quantitatem, ita aequalitas vel convertibilitas in quantitate ad substantiam. Sed identitas non est communis ad aequale et inaequale. Igitur aequale in quantitate, quod est convertibile, non est commune ad identitatem et ad diversitatem.
....
Redactio A (M, 6ra-b): art. 3
…. Ergo unitati convertibili non opponitur per se aliqua unitas secundum rem, sed solum pluralitas.
Ex his elicio duo corollaria.
Primum corollarium est quod unum est magis positivum quam pluralitas. Probatio: quia illud quod magis convenit cum positivis quam cum privativis est magis positivum quam privativum. Sed unum magis convenit cum positivis quam cum privativis. Pluralitas autem e converso magis convenit cum privativis quam cum positivis. Ergo unum est magis positivum quam pluralitas. Probatio minoris: idem, simile, et aequale sunt magis positiva quam diversum, dissimile, et inaequale, et ista sunt <magis> privativa quam ista [!]. Sed idem, simile, et aequale ponuntur per se in coordinatione unitatis et non pluralitatis secundum Philosophum, V et X Metaphysicae, quia eadem sunt quorum substantia est eadem, similia quorum qualitas una, aequalia quorum quantitas una: V Metaphysicae, cap. de ad aliquid. Diversum vero, dissimile, et inaequale ponuntur in coordinatione pluralitatis, quia diversa sunt quorum substantia sunt diversa vel alia, dissimilia quorum quantitas alia, inaequalia quorum quantitas alia. Ergo unum magis convenit cum positi<vi>s quam cum privativis.
Ad hoc est manifeste Philosophus, X* Metaphysicae, 3 cap., dicitur autem ex contrario et ostenditur ipsum unum ex divisibili* in divisibile propter magis sensibilem multitudinem esse et divisibilem* quam indivisibile, quare ratione prior multitudo indivisibili propter sensum.
Secundum corollarium est quod duo individua unius speciei habent aliquam unitatem realem extra intellectum maiorem extensive u-/M 6rb/-nitate numerali et <minorem> [unitatem] intensive. Probatio: removens ab aliquibus aliquem gradum divisionis, ponit in eis aliquem gradum indivisionis. Patet quia remotio affirmationis est positio negationis, et e converso. Sed a duobus individuis eiusdem speciei removetur* aliquis gradus divisionis realis extra intellectum, qui non removetur ab individuis alterius speciei, quia duo individua diversarum [ex del. M] specierum plus differunt quam [duo in] duo individua eiusdem speciei. Ergo individuis eiusdem speciei oportet ponere aliquem gradum indivisionis realis oppositibilis* illi divisioni remotae. Divisio autem remota est divisio specifica. Ergo indivisio opposita est indivisio specifica.
Ex his potest elici probabiliter quod distinctio secundum quid ….
Redactio B (H, 1rb-va): art. 2
Tunc resumendo rationem primam potest sic argui: removens ab aliquibus aliquem modum proprium unitatis ex natura rei, ponit in eis aliquem modum non-unitatis. Sed ab essentia et proprietatibus relationis removetur aliquis modus proprius unitatis, ut ostensum est. Ergo etc.
Ex ista conclusione infero duo corollaria.
Primum est quod unum quod est convertibiliter* cum ente est formaliter aliquid positivum, et magis quam multitudo sibi opposita. Hoc sic probo: quia illud quod magis per se positiva in coordinatione* positivorum quam privativorum, est magis positivum quam sit aliud, si illud aliud sit positivum. Sed unum ponitur magis in coordinatione positivorum quam privativorum, magis etiam quam multitudo, quae tamen est aliquid positivum. Ergo etc. Minor probatur, quia idem, simile, et aequale, quae ponuntur in coordinatione[m] unitatis, sunt magis positivum quam diversum, dissimile, et inaequale his opposita, quae ponuntur in coordinatione pluralitatis. Ergo unum est magis positivum quam pluralitas. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus, IV Metaphysicae, ubi glossans X Metaphysicae et V de uno, exponens, dicit sic: dico autem ens contrarium et ostenditur ipsum unum ex divisibili in divisibile propter <magis> [ergo] sensibilem esse multitudinem. Ex quo patet quod, licet secundum intentionem Philosophi ex notitia multitudinis deveniamus in notitiam unius, non* tamen ipsum unum est minus positivum quam pluralitas vel multitudo.
Secundum est quod individua eiusdem speciei extra intellectum habent aliquam unitatem realem unitate numerali maiorem extensive, sed minorem intensive. Hoc probatur: removens gradum /H 1va/ aliquem distinctionis realis ab aliquibus ponit in eis oppositum modum unitatis vel indistinctionis. Sed ab individuis eiusdem speciei removetur aliquis* gradus distinctionis realiter, qui non removetur ab individuis diversarum specierum. Quod patet, quia aliter illa distinguerentur aequaliter inter se. Ergo est ibi gradus aliquis* unitatis ex natura rei illi distinctioni oppositus, qui non est inter individua diversarum specierum.
Secundo ad principale …
Redactio D (E, 95vb): art. 2
Tunc resumo rationem primam [primam]: removens ab aliquibus aliquem modum proprium unitati ex natura rei, ponit in eis aliquem modum non-unitatis ex natura rei. Sed ab essentia et relatione in divinis removetur aliquis modus proprius unitatis, scilicet convertibilitas. Ergo etc.
Ex ista conclusione infero* <duo> corollaria.
Primum est quod unum quod <est> convertibiliter cum ente est formaliter aliquid positivum magis quam sibi oppositum, scilicet multitudo. Et hoc probo sic: illud quod per se loquendo magis ponitur in coordinatione positivorum quam aliud, si aliud est positivum, et ipsum est per amplius positivum. Sed unum ponitur magis in coordinatione positivorum quam multitudo, quae tamen est positivum. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quia idem, simile, et aequale quae ponuntur* in coordinatione unitatis sunt magis positiva quam diversum, dissimile, et inaequale, quae ponunt in coordinatione pluralitatis*. Et hoc dicit Aristoteles, X Metaphysicae, glossans dicta sua quae dixerat in IV et V, de uno. Et exponens dicit sic: et ostenditur ipsum unum ut ex divisibili in divisibile propter magis sensibilem esse multitudinem. Et ita secundum Philosophum, licet ex notitia multitudinis deveniamus in notitiam unius, non tamen ipsum unum est minus positivum quam pluralitas vel multitudo.
Secundum corollarium est quod individua eiusdem speciei extra intellectum habent aliquam unitatem realem maiorem unitate numerali extensive, sed minorem intensive. Et hoc probo quia removens aliquem gradum distinctionis ab <aliquibus> [aliquo] ponit in eis oppositum modum unitatis vel indistinctionis. Sed ab individuis eiusdem speciei removetur aliquis modus distinctionis realis, qui non removetur ab individuis diversarum specierum. Quod patet, quia aliter distinguerentur aequaliter individua eiusdem speciei inter se sicut individua diversarum specierum, quod est falsum. Quare etc.
Secunda ratio principalis ad principale est …
Redactio C (C, 3rb): art. 2
Contra: adhuc subiectum et propria passio sunt unum convertibiliter, et tamen non sunt unum sed sunt diversa.
Respondeo: non est ad oppositum, quia constat quod ut sunt convertibilia sunt unum, scilicet subiecto.
Ex ista ratione principali elicio dua corollaria.
Primum est quod unum est magis positivum quam multitudo sibi opposita. Probo: quod per se ponitur magis in coordinatione positivorum quam privativorum, magis est positivum quam aliud. Unum est huiusmodi. Probo minorem, quia idem, simile, aequale sunt in una coordinatione, et constat quod sunt positiva. Ista autem sunt species unius. Diversum autem, dissimile, et inaequale sunt in alia coordinatione, et constat quod magis sunt privativa. Ista autem sunt species multitudinis. Quare etc. Haec est intentio Philosophi, X Metaphysicae, ubi dicit [lac. ca. 5 litt.], dicitur ex contrario, et ostenditur unum ex divisibile in divisibile [indivisibili], propter magis sensibilem multitudinem esse et divisibile quam indivisibile. Quare ratione prior multitudo indivisibili propter sensum. Secundo vult expresse quod pro tanto magis attribuat rationem positivi multitudini* quam uni, quia est magis sensibile et magis apparens*.
Secundum corollarium: quod individua eiusdem speciei habent unitatem realem maiorem extensive quam sit unitas numeralis intensive. Probo: removens gradum divisionis realis ab aliquibus ponit in eis gradum indivisionis realis oppositum. Sed a duobus individuis eiusdem speciei removetur gradus divisionis realis, quia gradus divisionis individuorum diversarum specierum. Igitur in eis ponitur gradus indivisionis oppositae. Iste non est nisi gradus indivisionis in specie. Probo minorem, quia constat quod individua diversarum specierum differunt aliquo gradu differentiae* qua non differunt individua eiusdem speciei.
Et formetur sic ratio: inter quae non est gradus differentiae qui est inter aliqua, ab eis removetur gradus divisionis sibi oppositis, qui est in istis*. Sed inter individua eiusdem specie, etc. Igitur in eis ponitur gradus indivisionis oppositus, qui non est nisi unitas specifica.
Secundo ad principalem conclusionem …
Redactio A. (M, 5ra): art. 2
Et ita pono ibi triplicem non-identitatem secundum quid.
Prima est non-identitas secundum quid quiditativa, quia illud quod non est aliud primo modo dicendi per se, est non idem illi secundum quid quiditative. Sed* essentia non est relatio primo modo dicendi per se, quia tunc in quocumque esset essentia esset relatio. Et ita* essentia est non eadem secundum quid quiditative relationi.
Secundo est ibi non-identitas secundum quid intensiva vel intensive, quia essentia est perfectior intensive relatione. Quod probo, quia perfectio simpliciter est nobilior* non-perfectione simpliciter. Essentia est summa perfectio simpliciter; nulla autem relatio in Deo est perfectio simpliciter formaliter, quia tunc nulla persona* esset simpliciter perfecta. Ergo essentia est perfectior formaliter intensive relatione. Quod autem perfectius est intensive aliquo est non* idem* illi secundum quid intensive; [ergo essentia est non eadem secundum quid intensive] ergo essentia est non eadem secundum quid relationi intensive.
Tertio est ibi non-identitas secundum quid extensive, quia illud quod est in aliquo in quo non est aliud* est non idem illi secundum quid* extensive. Sed in quocumque est relatio, est essentia, et non convertitur*. Ergo essentia est non eadem relationi secundum quid extensive.
Et si arguatur: est ibi non-identitas secundum quid et diminuta*, ergo est ibi aliqua imperfectio et diminutio – respondeo quod diminutio est triplex. Est enim diminutio perfectionis simpliciter et est diminutio imperfectionis* sibi opposita et est diminutio rationis neutrae*. Dico quod diminutio perfectionis simpliciter est imperfectionis; sed diminutio imperfectionis est perfectionis; sed diminutio* rationis neutrae*, ubi* non debet esse illa diminutio est imperfectionis, ubi autem debet esse est perfectionis. Ad propositum dico quod non-identitas simpliciter non est perfectionis, sed est imperfectionis in uno supposito, quia ponit diversitatem simpliciter, et per consequens compositionem. Et ideo diminutio non-identitatis est positio identitatis simpliciter, quia ponit perfectionem. Et ideo talis diminutio, cum sit diminutio imperfectionis, non concludit imperfectionem sed magis perfectionem.
Quantum ad tertium articulum principalem ….
{TEXT CONTINUED IN TEXT IV BELOW}
Redactio B (H, 1va): art. 2
Dico quod inter essentiam divinam et proprietatem est triplex non-identitas secundum quid, videlicet quiditative vel quiditativa, intensiva, vel extensiva.
Prima patet, quia omne illud quod non est aliud quiditive est illo modo non ipsum, id est quiditative. Sed relatio non est quiditative essentia, nec e converso. Ergo etc.
Secunda non-identitas patet, quia quod est perfectius alio non est illud intensive. Sed essentia, cum sit perfectio simpliciter, est nobilior et perfectior relatione, quod non est perfectio simpliciter. Ergo etc.
Tertia etiam patet, quia illud quod excedit aliud extensive non est idem ei extensive. Sed essentia divina excedit quamlibet relationem originis, cum sit in pluribus quam ipsa. Ergo etc.
Contra, quia negatio praeposita termino communi confundit ipsum et facit eum stare pro quolibet suo inferiori. Ergo si inter ista, scilicet inter essentiam divinam et relationem, est aliqua non-identitas, et ita per consequens nulla est inter ea identitas.
Praeterea, secundo sic: ad affirmativam de praedicato infinito sequitur negativa de praedicato finito, secundum Philosophum, II Perihermeneias. Ergo ad istam ‘inter essentiam et relationem est aliqua non-identitas’, quae est affirmativa* de praedicato infinito, sequitur ista negativa quae est de praedicato finito, videlicet quod ibi est nulla identitas. Haec est falsa. Ergo etc.
Tertio, quia inferius infert superius …
Redactio D (E, 95vb-96ra): art. 2
Dico ergo quod inter divinam essentiam et proprietatem relativam est triplex non-identitas secundum quid, scilicet quiditativa, intensiva, et extensiva.
De prima patet, quia omne illud quod non est aliud quiditative est illo modo non ipsum, scilicet* quiditative. Sed essentia et relatio sunt huiusmodi. Ergo, etc.
De secunda patet, quia illud quod est perfectius alio est non illud intensive. Sed essentia per suam rationem formalem est perfectior simpliciter intensive quam sit relatio. Ergo etc.
De tertia patet, quia illud quod excedit aliud extensive est non idem illi extensive. Sed essentia excedit qua<m>libet relationem originis, cum sit in qualibet persona, relatio vero originis non. Ergo etc.
Sed quidam arguit contra, quia negatio <praeposita> [proposita] termino communi confundit* ipsum et facit eum stare pro quolibet inferiori. Ergo si inter essentiam et relationem concedit non-identitas, ergo inter essentiam et relationem nulla erit /E 96ra/ identitas.
Secundo sic: ad affirmativam de praedicato infinito sequitur negativa de praedicato finito negato, secundum Aristotelem, II Perihermenias. Ergo ad istam ‘inter essentiam et relationem est aliqua non-identitas’, sequitur ista quod inter essentiam et relationem non est identitas. Sed haec est falsa. Ergo etc.
Tertio sic: inferius infert superius …
Redactio C (C, 3rb-va): art. 2
Unde sciendum quod in divinis est triplex non-identitas secundum quid.
Una quiditativa, accipiendo quidditatem pro eo quod dicitur in primo modo dicendi per se. Probo: essentia non est paternitas in primo modo dicendi per se; igitur quiditative secundum quid non sunt* idem.
Secunda* non-identitas secundum quid est intensiva. Probo: quod est perfectius alio formaliter est non idem illi intensive. Essentia est perfectior relatione, cum relatio non dicat perfectionem simpliciter.
Tertia* identitas est extensiva. Probo: quae sic se habent quod unum excedit aliud realiter, sunt non idem extensive. Essentia et relatio sunt huiusmodi, quia essentia excedit relationem, cum una sit infinita et alia non. Igitur, etc.
Quod autem in divinis sit aliqua non-/C 3va/-identitas patet expresse per Augustinum, VII De trinitate, cap. 2: eo inquit sapiens quo essentia, eo Filius quo Verbum. Non tamen eo Verbum quo sapiens. Ex hoc sic: ubi est ‘eo’ et ‘non eo’ ablative*, ibi aliqua non-identitas. Sic est hic. Igitur, etc.
Dices: verum est secundum rationem.
Contra: eo modo negat ‘non’, cum dicit ‘non eo’, quo affirmat ‘eo’. Sed affirmat non tantum secundum rationem. Igitur etc.
Sed contra istam conclusionem arguo primo sic: negatio praeposita termino communi confundit eum, et facit eum tenere pro omnibus contentis sub eo. Sed ita est hic, cum dicitur ‘aliqua non-identitas’. Igitur sequitur nulla identitas.
Secundo sic: ad affirmativam de praedicato infinito, sequitur negativa de praedicato finito. Sed cum dicitur ‘aliqua non-identitas’, accipitur affirmativa de praedicato infinito. Igitur sequitur ista non est aliqua identitas. Sed haec est falsa. Igitur et praedicato*.
Tertio sic: semper inferius infert suum superius …
Redactio A (M, 5ra-b): art. 3
Quantum ad tertium articulum principalem pono duas conclusiones. Prima est quod essentia et relatio non distinguuntur simpliciter sicut dicunt aliqui. Secunda conclusio est quod ex natura rei distinguuntur secundum quid.
<1>Primam conclusionem probo, quia illa quae simpliciter distinguuntur simpliciter ponunt in numerum. Sed essentia et relatio non ponunt in numerum. Probatio, quia illa quae simpliciter ponunt in numerum simpliciter numerantur*. Essentia autem et relatio non numerantur, quia tunc in Deo esset quaternitas rei, quod est contra decretalem “Dampnamus”. Ergo non distinguuntur simpliciter.
<2> Item, illud quod simpliciter distinguitur ab aliquo simpliciter negatur /M 5rb/ de illo, quia unumquodque eo modo negatur de aliquo quomodo distinguitur ab illo …
<3> Item, illud quod est simpliciter idem alicui simpliciter praedicatur* de illo, et illud quod simpliciter distinguitur ab aliquo simpliciter negatur de illo. Si ergo essentia simpliciter distinguitur a relatione, et constat quod sit simpliciter eadem sibi, ergo simpliciter negabitur et simpliciter affirmabitur de ipsa …
Quantum ergo ad tertium articulum et principalem, dico quod sicut ibi est triplex non-identitas secundum quid, ita est ibi triplex distinctio secundum quid praevia* triplici non-identitate praedictae. Et primo est ibi distinctio secundum quid ex natura rei quiditativa praevia* non-identitati quiditativae. Secundo est ibi distinctio secundum quid intensive praevia* non-identitati secundum quid intensive. Tertio est ibi distinctio secundum quid <extensive> [intensive M] praevia* non-identitati secundum quid extensive. Et non accipio hic* distinctionem pro illa relatione distinctionis, quia sic inter essentiam et relationem nec est identitas nec distinctio, cum utrumque sit relatio, inter ipsa non sit alia* relatio, immo sic accipiendo distinctionem pro illa relatione, sic Deus non distinguitur a creatura, quia Deus non refertur realiter ad creaturam, nec Pater sic distinguitur realiter a Filio, quia Pater non refertur realiter ad Filium per relationem distinctionis. Et ideo accipio hic distinctionem fundamentaliter* proportionaliter* his quae ponimus distingui ex natura rei. Sic intelligendo dico quod divinae simplicitati* non magis repugnat distinctio secundum quid quam non-identitas secundum quid. Patet, quod nihil repugnat magis affirmationi quam negatio*. Si ergo negatio identitatis secundum quid non repugnat identitati simpliciter, nec distinctio secundum quid repugnat identitati simpliciter, et hoc patet in generali, quia talis secundum quid non repugnat [non] tali simpliciter. Ergo quod sit ibi identitas simpliciter et distinctio secundum quid nulla est repugnantia.
Istas conclusiones probo per ordines. Probo primam …. Secundam ….tertiam conclusionem …
Redactio B (H, 1vb-2rb): art. 3
Quantum ad tertium articulum, expono primo quid hic intelligo per distinctionem, quia per ipsam non intelligo aliquam relationem realem distinctam*, quia sic[ut] Deus non distinguitur realiter a creatura, nec est idem sibi realiter, sed nulla relatio sit realis eius ad se ipsum nec ad creaturam. Sed accipio* hic distinctionem fundamentaliter pro positivo*, et positivo eo modo quo negantes aequalitatem esse relationem realem diversam ab extremis, concedunt* tamen <quantitatem> [qualitatem] minorem esse inaequalem* <maiori> fundamentaliter.
Tunc pono duas propositiones. Prima est negativa ista: inter essentiam et proprietates non est aliqua distinctio simpliciter. Secunda affirmativa ista: inter ea est aliqua distinctio secundum quid.
Prima <propositio> sic probatur: quaecumque sunt sic distincta simpliciter, ponuntur in numerum. Sed ista simpliciter non ponuntur in numerum. Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia talia sunt simpliciter multa. Minor etiam patet, quia tunc esset ibi quaternitas rerum, puta una essentia et tres proprieta<te>s.
Praeterea: quaecumque …. /H 2ra/ ….
Secunda conclusioaffirmativa est quod aliquo modo distinguuntur. Hanc probo, ubi est advertendum quod inter ipsa est triplex distinctio secundum quid triplici non-identitati correspondens, scilicet quiditativa, intensiva, et extensiva. Primum patet, quia omne positivum quod non est quiditative aliud est aliquo modo quiditative distinctum ab eo; essentia divina non est quiditative relatio nec e converso, ut patet; ergo etc. <Secunda> [Minor] patet, quia essentia est perfectio simpliciter, relatio /H 2rb/ autem non, ut in secundo articulo patebat*. Tertia etiam patet, quia quod est alicubi ubi non est aliud nec esse potest est ab eo extensive distinctum; huiusmodi est essentia respectu relationis, ut patet; Ergo etc.
Praeterea, in generali ….
Redactio D (E,96rb-va): art. 3
Quantum ad tertium articulum, expono primo quid intelligo per distinctionem, quia per ipsam non intelligo aliquam relationem realem distinctionis*, quia sic Deus non distingueretur realiter a creatura nec esset sibi ipsi idem realiter, cum nulla sit relatio realis eiusdem ad se ipsum nec ad creaturam. Sed accipio hic distinctionem fundamentaliter pro positivo, et <positivo> [passivo*] eo modo quo <negantes> [negationes] aequalitatem esse relationem realem diversam ab extremis, concedunt tamen quantitatem minorem esse inaequalem maiorifundamentaliter.
Tunc hoc supposito pono duas conclusiones. Prima est negativa, scilicet quod inter essentiam et proprietatem non est aliqua distinctio simpliciter. Secunda est affirmativa, scilicet quod inter ea est aliqua distinctio secundum quid.
Prima <propositio> sic probatur: quaecumque sunt distincta simpliciter, ponunt in numerum simpliciter. Sed ista non ponunt in numerum simpliciter. Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia talia sunt simpliciter multa. Minor patet, quia tunc esset ibi quaternitas rerum, scilicet essentia una, tres personae et relationes.
Praeterea: quaecumque simpliciter distinguuntur …. /E 96va/ ….
Secunda conclusio est affirmativa, scilicet quod aliquo modo distinguuntur. Probatio, ubi est advertendum quod inter ipsa est triplex distinctio secundum quid triplici non-identitati correspondens, scilicet quiditativa, intensiva, et extensiva. Primum patet, quia omne positivum* quod non est quiditative aliud est aliquo modo distinctum ab eo; sed essentia divina non quiditative relatio; ergo etc. Secundum patet, quia perfectius alio est aliquo modo distinctum intensive ab ipso; sed essentia divina, cum sit perfectio simpliciter, est aliquo modo perfectior relatione*; ergo, etc. Tertium patet, quia quod est alicubi ubi non est aliud nec esse potest est aliquo modo extensive ab ipso distinctum; huiusmodi est essentia respectu relationis, ut patet; ergo, etc.
Praeterea, in generali ….
Redactio C (C, 3va-b): art. 3
Quantum ad tertium articulum dico duas conclusiones: unam negativam et aliam affirmativam. Negativa est quod inter essentiam et relationem non est distinctio simpliciter. Affirmativa quod ibi est distinctio secundum quid. Ad quarum evidentiam sciendum quod hic non sumitur ‘distinctio’ pro relatione distinctionis, quia tunc inter Deum et creaturam esset relatio realis, cum sit ibi distinctio realis. Sed accipio distinctionem pro substrato*, scilicet pro pluralitate* positivorum propriorum.
<1> Hoc viso, probo primam conclusionem sic: quaecumque simpliciter \distinguuntur/, simpliciter ponunt in numerum. Sed relatio et essentia non ponunt simpliciter in numerum, quia sic ibi esset quaternitas rerum, quod est contra capitulum “Dampnamus”.
Secundo sic: quae simpliciter differuntur, simpliciter a se mutuo negantur …. /C 3vb/ ….
<2>Secunda conclusio affirmativa est quod inter essentiam et relationem est distinctio ex natura rei secundum quid. Et sunt ibi tres distinctiones secundum quid, sicut dictum est supra de non-identitate. Et probatur per easdem [per easdem] rationes per quas prius probatum est.
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* Once again thanks to Domenico Priori and the comune di Appignano del Tronto for making possible the second Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano and this volume; the research was supported by a grant from the Danish Research Council for the Humanities (SHF 55-00-0716). William Duba and especially Chris Schabel gave valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I learned much about approaches to analyzing different versions of the same text by reading LAUGE O. NIELSEN’s Peter Auriol’s Way With Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol’s Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s First and Fourth Books of the Sentences, in G. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 149-219.
In the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, when the bachelors were still reading the Sentences over the course of two years, and hence two books each year, the period was 14 Sept. to 10 Oct., and then a similar period for the second term; see P. GLORIEUX, L’enseignement au moyen âge: Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 35 (1968), pp. 65-186, esp. pp. 138-39. From around 1320, and presumably at the time when Francesco read his Sentences commentary, the Franciscan bachelors, at least, were allowed only one year to comment on the Sentences, so in addition to the long period from 14 Sept. to 10 Oct., the Principia would take place at the beginning of January, and in periods following the first of March and the first of May; see GLORIEUX, L’enseignement, loc. cit.; ZENON KALUZA, La nature des écrits de Jean de Ripa, in Traditio 43 (1987), pp. 257-98, pp. 260-74 passim, but esp. 260-61. See also P. GLORIEUX, Sentences (commentaires sur les) in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 14 (Paris, 1939), coll. 1860-84, esp. col. 1862.
Actually there were two parts to each Principium: the collatio, a type of laudation of Lombard and of the book of Lombard’s work the bachelor was about to comment on, and the quaestio collativa, which was the actual question debated by the bachelors. See KALUZA, La nature, cit. n. 1 above, p. 260.
The order of Francesco’s Principia over the four books in the only manuscript to contain them all, Madrid, Biblioteca nacional 504, is I, IV, II, III. This undoubtedly reflected the order in which they were delivered, since this order was so typical around the turn of the thirteenth to the fourteenth century that Remigio dei Girolami claimed that it was an old custom; see SYLVAIN PIRON, Le poète et le théologien : une rencontre dans le studium de Santa Croce, in Picenum Seraphicum n.s. 19 (2000), pp. 87-134, esp. p. 92 referring to EMILIO PANELLA, Il De subiecto theologiae(1297-1299) di Remigio dei Girolami O.P. (Milano: Massimo, 1982), p. 10, n. 1 (although compare with Piron, loc. cit., n. 20). Cf. also FRIEDMAN and SCHABEL, Francis of Marchia’s Commentary, cit. n. 12 below, p. 48 and n. 31.
It has even been suggested by E. Ypma that the bachelors shared the text of their lectures with each other in advance of the lectures themselves, so they could adequately respond to each other; cf. KALUZA, La nature, cit. n. 1 above, p. 271 and n. 41. The fact that there was a set order among the bachelors holding their Principia, with the Carmelite bachelor holding the first lecture and one of the two Dominican bachelors holding the last lecture, meant that sometimes over the course of the series of Principia there would be a type of running gun battle, in which, e.g., the Carmelite might respond in the second Principial session to criticism made of his first Principium by one of the other bachelors during the first session.
Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 95 (2002), pp. 93-183, esp. p. 97.
See FRANZ EHRLE, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V,Franziskanische Studien, suppl. 9 (Münster i. W., 1925), pp. 39-47, GLORIEUX, L’enseignement, cit. n. 1 above, p. 140. Pace MARIANI, p. 97, n. 3, a part of Peter’s Principium (the collationes) has been edited; see STEPHEN F. BROWN, Peter of Candia’s Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard, in Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor (Franciscan Institute Publications, Theology Series 6 - St. Bonaventure, NY, 1976), pp. 141-76 (in addition, EHRLE, loc. cit., edits portions of the text).
See KALUZA, La nature, cit. n. 1 above, specifically on the Principia, pp. 260-74, where Kaluza shows that Ripa’s Quaestio de gradu supremo is the quaestio collativa part of his Principium in I Sent.
See GLORIEUX, L’enseignement, cit. n. 1 above, p. 140; WILLIAM J. COURTENAY, Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. 143, n. 73. The date is from Courtenay; Glorieux maintains 1362-63. Bonsemblans’ Principium (all four books) is, as far as I am aware, unedited; it is found in München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 26711, ff. 397-406, and Vatican, BAV Vat. lat. 981, ff. 91-105.
On Auriol, see LAUGE O. NIELSEN, The Intelligibility of Faith and the Nature of Theology: Peter Auriole’s Theological Programme, in Studia Theologica 53/1 (1999), pp. 26-39; on Rimini, see PASCALE BERMON, La Lectura sur les deux premiers livres des Sentences de Grégoire de Rimini O.E.S.A. (1300-1358), in G. Evans, ed., Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 267-85, esp. 273-74.
PETRUS LOMBARDUS, Prologus libri IV Sententiarum: “Horum igitur Deo odibilem ecclesiam evertere atque ora oppilare, ne virus nequitiae in alios effundere queant, et lucernam veritatis in candelabro exaltare volentes, in labore multo ac sudore volumen, Deo praestante, compegimus ex testimoniis veritatis in aeternum fundatis, in quatuor libris distinctum. In quo maiorum exempla doctrinamque reperies, in quo per dominicae fidei sinceram professionem vipereae doctrinae fraudulentiam prodidimus, aditum demonstrandae veritatis complexi nec periculo impiae professionis inserti, temperato inter utrumque moderamine utentes. Sicubi vero parum vox nostra insonuit non a paternis discessit limitibus …. brevi volumine complicans Patrum sententias, appositis eorum testimoniis, ut non sit necesse quaerenti librorum numerositatem evolvere, cui brevitas collecta quod quaeritur offert sine labore. In hoc autem tractatu non solum pium lectorem, sed etiam liberum correctorem desidero, maxime ubi profunda versatur veritatis quaestio, quae utinam tot haberet inventores, quot habet contradictores.”
As BERMON, La Lectura, cit. n. 9 above, pp. 272-73, has recently noted, the Prologue is in its origin a preliminary text to the Sentences as a whole, and not merely to book I. Nevertheless, as Chris Schabel pointed out to me, from the mid-fourteenth century and on the Prologue did actually come to beconsidered a part of commentaries on book I of the Sentences; cf. an example of this trend in Paul of Perugia (See SCHABEL’s forthcoming article, The Sentences Commentary of Paul of Perugia, O.Carm. With an Edition of His Question on Divine Foreknowledge). Indeed, the fact that Francesco revised his Principium in I Sent. into the first question of the Prologue to one of the versions of his Sent. commentary (as I will argue below) is further indication that already in his day the Prologue was considered to be closely related to book I.
The one exception is Vat. lat. 943, a collection of scattered questions from Francesco and Peter Auriol.
RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN and CHRIS SCHABEL, Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences. Question List and State of Research, in Mediaeval Studies 63 (2001), pp. 31-106, esp. the question lists on pp. 61 and 73.
For more about the Reportatio and Scriptum versions of Francesco’s I Sentences, see Chris Schabel’s contribution to this volume and FRIEDMAN and SCHABEL, Francis of Marchia’s Commentary, cit. n. 12 above, esp. pp. 49-54. I hope in a future publication to return to the issue of why the later, Scriptum version of Francesco’s Sentences commentary does not contain a version of this question.
F. 1ra: “Circa prologum Sententiarum quaero primo utrum ens simpliciter simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae viatoris”. Schabel and I used this exact reading for our question list for the Prologue as presented in our article from 2001 and in the question list given above.
I.e. Naples, Biblioteca nazionale VII. C. 27, ff. 1r-3r; Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale 767, ff. 109r-11r; Admont, Bibliothek der Benediktinerabtei 178, ff. 124ra-26vb; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 532, ff. 2ra-4vb. Thanks to Chris Schabel for checking microfilms of the first three of these manuscripts for me. Neither Paris 3071, Vat. Ross. 525, nor Vat. Chigi lat. B.VII.113 have running titles, and the question appears in Vat. lat. 943 isolated from the rest of the Prologue.
There is a large literature on Scotus and the formal non-identity or formal distinction. Some of the more important studies include: ALLAN B. WOLTER, The Formal Distinction, in J.K. Ryan and B.M. Bonansea (eds.), John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965 (Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 1965), pp. 45-60 (reprint in: M.M. Adams [ed.], The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus (Ithaca - London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 27-41; HESTER G. GELBER, Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1974); MARILYN McCORD ADAMS, Ockham on Identity and Distinction, in Franciscan Studies 36 (1976), pp. 5-74; MICHAEL JOSEPH JORDAN, Duns Scotus on the Formal Distinction (Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1984 - UMI number 8424118), which on pp. 203-26 contains a discussion of some of the literature up to 1984; TIMOTHY B. NOONE, Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction, in Franciscan Studies 53 (1993), pp. 231-61.
Madrid, Biblioteca nacional 504, f. 6va: “Et sic identitas simpliciter salvat identitatem vel simplicitatem, distinctio secundum quid salvat pluralitatem personarum.” Here Francesco seems to be echoing the famous saying of BOETHIUS: “substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem”, from De trinitate, cap. 6, (in Tractates De Consolatione Philosophiae, eds. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, and S.J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 28.7-30.9).
Madrid, Biblioteca nacional 504, f. 6rb: “Ex his potest elici probabiliter quod distinctio secundum quid relationis et essentiae inconvertibilis praesupponit distinctionem priorem secundum quid convertibilem [convertibilis M], quia proprietas inconvertibilis praesupponit proprietatem convertibilem. Distinctum autem secundum quid convertibile cum essentia non est aliquod <distinctum*> [lac. 7 litt. M] sed tantum essentiale. Ergo distinctio secundum quid essentiae et relationis praesupponit distinctionem secundum quid attributorum.” On Francesco’s rejection of the formal distinction between the attributes, see RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN, Francis of Marchia and John Duns Scotus on the Psychological Model of the Trinity, in Picenum Seraphicum. Rivista di studi storici e francescani n.s. 18 (1999), pp. 11-56, esp. pp. 24-29. As mentioned, the Scriptum version of Francesco’s Sentences commentary is the later redaction as compared to the Reportatio version, the Prologue of which is under discussion here; on the order between the two versions, see Chris Schabel’s contribution to this volume.
In FRIEDMAN and SCHABEL, Francis of Marchia’s Commentary, cit. n. 12 above, we neglected to note, p. 73, that manuscripts ACL do in fact contain qq. 1b-1e, i.e. the four parts of this last article of the question.
Here are Father Mariani’s characterizations of the four redactions (loc. cit., p. 94 – my additions in square brackets):
La redazione A è contenuta nel Madrid 504 [= M] (<3ra-10rb>): è la più completa, la più ampia e sviluppata.
La redazione B, si trova in 4 ms: Vat Ross. 525, <1ra-4vb>; Napoli VII.C.27, <1ra-5ra>; Paris latin 3071 [= H], <1ra-4ra>; Troyes 767, <109ra-111vb>: in raffronto con la redazione precedente, risulta più breve.
La redazione C, riportata da 3 ms, (Vat. Chig. B.VII.113 [= C], <1ra-4vb>; Admont 178, <124ra-126vb> e Leipzig 532, <2ra-4vb>) è più breve e meno sviluppata della precedente, della quale è una specie di riassunto.
La redazione D si trova nel ms Vat. lat. 943 [= E], <95rb-[98rb]>, ed è anche più abbreviata di quella precedentemente riferita.
Note that the three manuscripts in Father Mariani’s C redaction almost undoubtedly do share the same text, inasmuch as research to date has strongly suggested that – at least for parts of book I and II – the Admont manuscript was copied from the Leipzig manuscript was copied from the Chigi manuscript (see FRIEDMAN and SCHABEL, Francis of Marchia’s Commentary, cit. n. 12 above, pp. 50-54, esp. 53). Ihave not investigated the precise relation between the texts found in the four manuscripts that Father Mariani says share redaction B; this will, of course, be an important avenue for future research.
See Text I at the end of this article.
In all the texts: * = lectio incerta; \ …/ marks marginal or interlinear emandations; […] words deleted by the present editor for sense; <…> words inserted by the present editor for sense.
See Text II at the end of this article.
See Text III at the end of this article.
See Text IV at the end of this article.
I can mention here that this situation seems to be parallel to that found in book IV, where the Principium is “Circa principium quarti quaero utrum aliqua virtus sacramentalis possit cooperari instrumentaliter ad gratiae creationem …”, while the first question of Francesco’s IV Sent. is “Circa principium quarti quaero utrum aliqua virtus sacramentalis possit cooperari instrumentaliter ad gratiae creationem …” and thus precisely the same title for what are clearly, even on a quick inspection, very different questions (see, e.g. FRIEDMAN and SCHABEL, Francis of Marchia’s Commentary, cit. n. 12 above, p. 59).
Similarly the Principium in II runs “Circa secundum librum quaero utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis …”, whereas the first question of Marchia’s ReportatioA super IISent. is “Circa principium secundi libri Sententiarum quaero primo utrum creatio actio sit demonstrabilis de Deo …”, although in two manuscripts (H and D) the first question is as follows: “Utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis de Deo …” which is closer to the Principium (see FRIEDMAN and SCHABEL, Francis of Marchia’s Commentary, cit. n. 12 above, p. 85, n. 45).
Thus, it is only in book III that the Principium (“utrum Verbum divinum absque contradictione potuerit assmere individuum generis subalterni praeter individuum speciei specialissimae”) appears not to have a corresponding question in the commentary proper. The issue of the relationship between the Principia in II and IV Sent. and the corresponding questions in the commentary proper lies outside the scope of this paper.
In at least two spots in the texts appended to this paper, the C redaction appears to be more closely related to the A redaction than the B or D redactions are. In Text II, redactions A and C share the phrase “Quare ratione prior multitudo indivisibili propter sensum”, not found in B and D, and in Text IV a reference to the canon “Damnamus” from Lateran IV is shared by A and C but omitted in B and D. While interesting, this proves nothing about the relative ordering of the versions.